As reader Don points out below in an excerpt from a comment in another post, The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Frank Kendall has a huge credibility problem with the troubled F-35 program.
On F-35 the acquisition executive, General Bogdan, reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, who also serves as the Defense Acquisition Executive. Frank Kendall is the Pentagon's undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics. On the F-35 program Kendall is also the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA).
There are three milestones is systems acquisition:
--Milestone A—initiates technology maturation and risk reduction.
--Milestone B—initiates engineering and manufacturing development. (The current F-35 phase)
--Milestone C—initiates production and deployment.
Kendall, Feb 2012: "Putting the F-35 into production years before the first test flight was acquisition malpractice. It should not have been done, OK? But we did it, OK? Now we're paying the price for being wrong about that."
But then Kendall illustrates why an outside authority is required...
Nov, 2012
"We're going to work our way through this [sequestration]," Kendall told an investor conference hosted by Credit Suisse. "There's a lot of money still to be made."
Oct, 2013
"Program progress is sufficient for the department to budget for an increase in the production rate in fiscal year 2015."
Jan. 2014
I’m cautiously optimistic. I put out a decision memorandum recently outlining some of the things that need to be emphasized. The airframe itself is making reasonable progress through its test program."
Jun, 2014
“It’s frustrating to me that eight years into production we still have a fair amount of development to go, and I don’t want people to lose focus on that.”
So we have to endure the propaganda and counterattack with facts. As Bill Sweetman wrote (a few years back and got admonished by AV Week - EP) :
"Gentlemen , your target for tonight is Fort Worth. Flacks are predicted to be numerous and persistent on the run-in and over the target, and bullshit is expected to be dense throughout the mission. Synchronize watches and good luck.”
One could point out that "development" leading up the Joint Strike Fighter Program has been going on since the 1980's when one considers the track record of Harrier replacement ideas that as a history, contributed to the JSF. Here is a better understanding of DOD's attention deficit disorder problem with taking another try with the concept of joint service tactical aircraft.
1983- ATA, Advanced Tactical Aircraft
1983- ASTOVL, Advanced STOVL
1987- SSF STOVL, STOVL Strike Fighter
1988- NATF Naval ATF
1990- MRF Multi-Role Fighter
1992- A-X / A/F-X
1993- JAF- Joint Attack Fighter
1993- CALF- Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter
1994- JAST- Joint Affordable Strike Technology (breakdown of the players and money)
1996- JSF- Joint Strike Fighter Program
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-Time's Battleland - 5 Part series on F-35 procurement - 2013
-Summary of Air Power Australia F-35 points
-Bill Sweetman, Aviation Week and the F-35
-U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) F-35 reports
-F-35 JSF: Cold War Anachronism Without a Mission
-History of F-35 Production Cuts
-Looking at the three Japan contenders (maneuverability)
-How the Canadian DND misleads the public about the F-35
-Value of STOVL F-35B over-hyped
-Cuckoo in the nest--U.S. DOD DOT&E F-35 report is out
-6 Feb 2012 Letter from SASC to DOD boss Panetta questioning the decision to lift probation on the F-35B STOVL.
-USAFs F-35 procurement plan is not believable
-December 2011 Australia/Canada Brief
-F-35 Key Performance Perimeters (KPP) and Feb 2012 CRS report
-F-35 DOD Select Acquisition Report (SAR) FY2012
-Release of F-35 2012 test report card shows continued waste on a dud program
-Australian Defence answers serious F-35 project concerns with "so what?"
-Land of the Lost (production cut history update March 2013)
-Outgoing LM F-35 program boss admits to flawed weight assumptions (March 2013)
-A look at the F-35 program's astro-turfing
-F-35 and F-16 cost per flying hour
-Is this aircraft worth over $51B of USMC tac-air funding?
-Combat radius and altitude, A model
-F-35A, noise abatement and airfields and the USAF
-Deceptive marketing practice: F-35 blocks
-The concurrency fraud
-The dung beetle's "it's known" lie
-F-35's air-to-air ability limited
-F-35 Blocks--2006 and today
-The F-35B design is leaking fuel
-F-35 deliveries
-ADF's wacky F-35 assumptions
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