Going back to some previous posts on the replacement of the Collins class submarine misses some key items that really don't help beyond the cheer-leading.
Having Australia do every bit of a new submarine with very little outside help brings up one more glaring problem. We would be competition vs. established submarine builders and solution providers. This in turn could harm Australia's logistics supply chain for not just subs but other platforms and goods and services.
We cannot risk such a thing.
The right direction?
A short talk with Peter Goon (yet again) pointed out proper engineering thinking. He can do that because he is a wonderful communicator with a top command of the language: even classical reference.
Use an evolved acquisition strategy.
And here in my opinion is where today's resignation of the DMO boss Mr. King is timely for this topic. King and his kind are the exact opposite of sound, sage, established engineering best-practices. The Air Warfare Destroyer being one of King's monuments to the stupidity of man. A poster child for how not to do a proper teaming process. And maybe, that huge failure is enough of an object lesson to do the right thing with the replacement of the Collins submarine. We could treat the Air Warfare Destroyer debacle as a wake up call. A gift...of sorts. If we are willing to learn.
According to Peter, we must put the right people in charge that can craft the submarine replacement plan along with similar minded people along the way to endorse each major step. With the assistance of a credible, established submarine design house to share the risk, we have the potential for getting a strong means-tested submarine design plan. In-turn, that design house is given (by virtue of our needs) the potential for a new product line or product lines depending on how things roll, which can profit their organisation: both in capital and reputation.
Quoting Peter:
The essential capability documents needed for any acquisition strategy are:
Strategic Needs Analysis Report (SNAR) endorsed by the Defence Committee and the Government
The Statement of Requirement (SOR), derived from the SNAR and again endorsed by the Defence Committee and the Government
The Functional and Performance Specification (FPS), derived from the SOR and similarly endorsed.
The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), derived from the SOR and similarly endorsed.
Project Risk Management Master Plan (PRMMP) that is determined from a detailed Risk Identification, Analysis, Assessment and Mitigation process applied to and over the project.
An Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Plan.
The acquisition strategy (the capstone plan for doing the acquisition) that is most appropriate for the SEA 1000 New Submarine Project is called an EAS or Evolved Acquisition Strategy. An EAS approach properly applied will ensure the quickest, lowest risk, most cost effective and most capable solution for Australia, both in terms of the acquisition and life cycle sustainability, maintainability, operations and supportability as well as the maintenance of suitability and effectiveness for the whole of the life cycle.
Not only can this be a better way to replace the Collins submarine...but with the right opportunities and thinking...it can be a faster way to replace the Collins submarine.
When adding up all of the frequent-flier miles and droves of cubical-bunny expenses, it isn't a reach to state that the Australian taxpayer has invested up to this point, over a half-a-billion dollars for the alleged purpose of coming up with a Collins replacement plan.
For damn little to show for it.
So, the evolved acquisition strategy?
Now?
---Now---
Again, I think we as a country can do this. A sound Australian build and sustainment strategy for new submarines is possible.
As long as we listen to people like Peter and and many others of his kind who the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy has been notorious for ignoring.
To all of our loss.
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