When a submarine concept of operations fails (Group-think kills)

The WWII German sub boss, Karl Doenitz was told about fire control radar tests on one of their navy cruisers...before the war. And then asked how the advantage of a low silhouette of a u-boat on the surface would help things if the enemy had lots of radar capability. The same guy dismissed the air threat. And to some degree, the ship sonar threat; radio direction finding...well, you get it.

Reader M&S did some good analysis on this awhile back: numbers, threats....what are you trying to do?


(chart via www.uboat.net)


Other than rent-seeking and self-before service, I am curious if the Australian Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy can buy a clue on current and emerging ASW threats in the Pacific region?

Good to think about with all of the billions (needed?) to be spent on the Collins replacement.

Given the Collins replacement requirement, SEA1000 is faulty (PDF file)--it describes a capability only a U.S. Virginia-class nuke sub can do--how many RAN subs will return from a war patrol in the 2020s and beyond?

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